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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀects of conﬂict onset on asset markets applying the event study method-
ology. We consider a sample of 112 conﬂicts during the period 1974-2004 and ﬁnd that a sizeable
fraction of them had a signiﬁcant impact on stock market indices and on major commodity prices.
Furthermore, our results suggest that we are more likely to see investor reactions in response to con-
ﬂicts that occur in highly polarized settings, possibly because the expected duration and intensity
of the conﬂict is higher.
Keywords:C o n ﬂict onset, Event study, Asset markets, Polarization
JEL codes: G14, P16.
1. Introduction
The relationship between civil war and economic performance has recently come to the forefront of
the economic debate. The growing interest in the economic causes and consequences of civil wars has
spurred a large number of studies both in political science and in economics. Some of these studies
explore the factors that aﬀect the likelihood of conﬂict onset and duration (e.g., Collier and Hoeﬄer
(1998, 2004), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)); other studies ﬁnd a negative relationship between
political instability and investments (e.g., Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Svensson (1998)). A common
approach of these studies is to rely on cross country regressions in which dummy variables for the
presence of conﬂict in a given country at a given time are correlated to investment rates, economic
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eliana.laferrara@unibocconi.itgrowth, natural resource endowments, and many other variables. One criticism often addressed to this
approach is the diﬃculty in identifying a causal relationship between the occurrence of conﬂict and the
variable(s) of interest.
The purpose of our paper is to eﬀectively narrow down the analysis of the economic consequences of
wars to a context where the endogeneity problem is relatively easier to address, namely the relationship
between the onset of violent conﬂict and investors’ perceptions as measured by a s s e tm a r k e tr e a c t i o n s .
By asset markets we mean not only stock markets, but also the markets in which currencies, stan-
dardized commodities (such as oil and agricultural products), and futures contracts written on these
underlying assets are traded. We do this by relying on a methodology that is widely applied in ﬁnance,
but very seldom employed in the conﬂict literature: the event study approach.
Furthermore, a growing literature has addressed the relationship between polarization and conﬂict,
by examining whether the degree of polarization in a society can explain the likelihood of conﬂict onset
or the duration of conﬂicts once initiated (e.g., Horowitz (1985), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a,
2005b)). Very little is known, however, about the degree to which markets incorporate information
about the extent of polarization and its potential eﬀects on conﬂict. In this paper we try to establish
a link between conﬂict onset, polarization, and asset market reactions by conducting our event studies
separately for high and low polarization settings.
Our goal is thus threefold. First, we illustrate the event study methodology in a way that should
make it easily applicable to the empirical analysis of conﬂict. Second, we provide original empirical
results on the eﬀects that the onset of war has on key economic indicators such as stock market indices,
exchange rates, oil, and commodity prices. Finally, we investigate whether the eﬀects of conﬂict on
these variables diﬀer depending on the degree of polarization of the country (countries) involved in the
conﬂict.
We ﬁnd that, while standard OLS regressions (i.e., the dummy regression approach) fail to ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the full sample of conﬂicts, individual event studies do highlight some signiﬁcant
patterns. First of all, national stock markets are more likely to display positive reactions to conﬂict
onset compared to the World market, suggesting the possibility of war-induced rallies in which investors
tend to buy stocks and the initiation of conﬂi c ti ss e e na sas i g no fr e s o l v e . T h eU Ss t o c km a r k e ti s
the one that displays the strongest reactions. When we distinguish between internal and international
conﬂicts, we ﬁnd that international conﬂicts tend to have a more signiﬁcant impact on stock markets,
in both directions (positive and negative). Among other assets, some indices react to both types of
conﬂict (commodities and agricultural commodities), while others typically react to a single category
(internal for the price of gold and international for the dollar exchange rate). When we classify events
according to the region where they occur, we ﬁnd that Asia and the Middle East are the regions where
conﬂicts tend to have the strongest eﬀects on asset markets. Location in the Middle East is obviously
important for commodity indices including oil prices: 60% of the conﬂict onsets occurring in this region
2have an impact on oil futures that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Finally, our results on the role of
ethnic polarization in shaping investors’ reactions suggest that markets do indeed take into account the
social structure of the countries/regions where the conﬂict occurs when forming expectations on the
intensity and duration of wars. For example, 18% of the international conﬂicts taking place in highly
polarized countries have a negative impact on the World stock market index that we consider, while
none of those taking place in countries with low polarization do. More generally, polarization seems to
magnify asset market reactions to conﬂict onset.
This paper is related to several recent contributions that have explored the economic eﬀects of civil
conﬂict. Some studies apply the event study methodology to ﬁrm-level data and study how the stock
prices of diﬀerent ﬁrms respond to conﬂict in the regions where they operate. Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) focus on the conﬂict in the Basque region and conduct an event study on the announcement
(and subsequent end) of a cease-ﬁre by ETA between 1998 and 1999. They ﬁnd that only the stocks
of ﬁrms whose business activities in the Basque Country were signiﬁcant showed a positive response
to the cease-ﬁre. Guidolin and La Ferrara (2004) investigate the eﬀects of civil war in Angola on
the performance of diamond mining companies holding concessions in the country. They ﬁnd that in
concomitance with the termination of the war (as represented by the death of the rebels’ leader Jonas
Savimbi), the stocks of these companies showed negative abnormal returns, as opposed to positive.
They interpret this ﬁnding in the light of the abnormal proﬁt margins that some businesses can have
in conﬂict environments.
Another set of studies focuses on ﬁnancial indicators as opposed to ﬁrm-level data, and explores
either the eﬀect of the risk of war ex ante, or the consequences of diﬀering intensities in conﬂict ex post.
Among the former, Rigobon and Sack (2005) study the reaction of US ﬁnancial indicators to “war risk”
between January 2003 and March 2003, when the second Iraqi war became imminent. They ﬁnd that
increases in the level of war risk are associated to lower Treasury yields, lower equity prices, higher
oil futures prices, and a fall in the dollar. Furthermore, a signiﬁcant fraction of the variance of these
variables in the period under consideration can be attributed to the perceived risk of war. Wolfers and
Zitzewitz (2004) investigated the reaction of oil and stock prices to war-related news using prediction
markets, and in particular a “Saddam Security” traded on Tradesports that paid $10 if Saddam Hussein
had been removed from oﬃce by June 30, 2003. They interpret the evolution of this security’s price
as a proxy for the probability of war against Iraq between September 2002 and February 2003. Their
ﬁndings indicated that ex ante a 10 percent increase in the probability of war increased spot oil prices
by $1 and decreased the S&P500 by 1.5 percent. Finally, Schneider and Troeger (2004) study the
reactions of three stock market indices (Dow Jones, FTSE and CAC) to the intensity of three conﬂicts
in the period 1990-2000. Using Goldstein’s (1992) indicator of conﬂictive versus cooperative events,
they ﬁnd that the intensiﬁcation of conﬂict between the US-led alliance and Iraq had a positive impact
on the Dow Jones, as this was perceived as a sign of Western resolve. For the other two conﬂicts, severe
3conﬂictive developments had a negative impact on stock markets, while cooperative developments were
perceived as good news in the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, and bad news in the ex-Yugoslavia.
One ﬁrst dimension in which our paper diﬀers from the existing literature is the methodology
employed: we rely on event studies rather than on EGARCH and TGARCH model-based ﬁltered
measures of risk (volatility) because we are not dealing with high frequency data (in fact we use weekly
and not daily data), hence the problems of time dependence in the variance are less serious, while the
event study methodology allows us to exactly measure the eﬀects of violent conﬂict news (initiations)
on asset prices. Our work also diﬀers from all three studies mentioned above because it considers a
much broader set of conﬂicts, namely, all the conﬂicts for which the initiation can be dated in a precise
week in the period 1974-2004. To this purpose, we use data on conﬂicts from the PRIO-Uppsala Armed
Conﬂict Dataset 3.0 that can be assigned with high “precision” to a week within our sample period.
Moving away from case studies obviously has a cost, and that is the lack of precision on the daily
evolution of the conﬂicts (or of perceptions about the risk of an impending conﬂict). Our indicator for
the onset of conﬂict corresponds to the oﬃcial starting date, and this is inevitably more or less accurate
depending on the occurrence of previous events and on the degree to which a war was anticipated.
However, it should be noted that these eﬀects and measurement issues should bias our results towards
ﬁnding no eﬀect of a conﬂict on asset prices, in the sense that when the conﬂict is perceived as initiated
by other events, the oﬃcial starting date should contain no new information for market participants.
To the extent that we do ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects, this can be interpreted as a signal that markets learn
something in the week in which a war oﬃcially starts: the new information may be simply that the
probability of conﬂict occurrence has increased from a positive (possibly high) value to one, or it may
relate to the aggressiveness of each party and how long the conﬂict is going to last. On the other hand,
using a large sample has the advantage of allowing us to draw general conclusions. In this sense we
see our choice of conducting an event study analysis on the broadest possible set of conﬂicts for which
political and ﬁnancial data can be matched as the closest correspondent to the cross-country regressions
on which much of the current debate is based.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a simple theoretical
framework on asset market reactions to conﬂict news and on the role played by polarization in this
context. In section 3 we illustrate the event study methodology, both in the standard version based
on the selection of event and estimation windows, and in what we shall call the “dummy regression”
approach. Section 5 contains our ﬁrst body of empirical results. We start with an illustration of the
event study methodology based on the second Iraqi war and then proceed to summarize the results
from the full set of event studies and all conﬂicts occurred in the past thirty years, exploring market
reactions to diﬀerent types of conﬂict. In section 6 we perform an analogous exercise, but we allow
reactions to diﬀer according to the degree of polarization of the region where the conﬂict takes place.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
42. Theoretical framework
The goal of our empirical exercise is to measure the eﬀects of oﬃcial conﬂict onset by looking at
investors’ reactions. Such a task is of importance not only to ﬁnancial economists and practioners (who
typically study the way in which news are compounded into equilibrium prices, see e.g. Bittlingmayer,
1998), but also to political scientists who may be interested in assessing both the ability of asset markets
to predict situations of political tension (see e.g. Chan and Bobrow, 1981, for an early example) and the
eﬀects of conﬂicts on expectations and the process of capital accumulation. If security prices reﬂect the
present discounted value of the long-run stream of cash ﬂows generated by an asset, the measurement of
the economic eﬀects of conﬂict onset can be performed by looking at changes of asset prices that occur
in connection with such events. As we shall conduct our analysis on several asset markets, possibly
ﬁnding heterogeneous responses, in what follows we brieﬂy address the question of why asset markets
can react diﬀerently to the same news, and how variables that help to predict the intensity or duration
of a conﬂict (e.g., polarization) may aﬀect asset reactions.
One simple but ubiquitous empirical fact is that diﬀerent asset markets react with diﬀerent intensity
to an identical piece of news. This happens rather frequently following announcements of changes in US
interest rates, but also other kinds of (possibly political) news. The explanation of such heterogeneous
reactions can sometimes be traced back to a number of well-deﬁned economic laws (e.g. that arbitrage
opportunities ought to be absent or short-lived), although the possibility to understand them in a
uniﬁed explanatory framework also exists.
Let us start from the fact that all assets carry a positive value insofar as they will produce positive,
possibly uncertain, cash ﬂows at some future date. Such cash ﬂow takes the form of an explicit
monetary payment in the case of ﬁnancial markets: stocks pay uncertain dividend streams; bonds
pay relatively certain coupons; exchange rates correspond to the relative, current price of short-term
deposits denominated in diﬀerent currencies and which pay a predetermined interest rate. For other
non-ﬁnancial assets, the cash ﬂows are implicit and take the form of future uncertain productive and/or
consumption uses: for instance, a futures contract on coﬀee beans delivers a predetermined quantity of
the commodity at a later date. In any event, such future, uncertain cash ﬂows need to be discounted
to the present in order to ﬁnd the price of the underlying asset. The discount rate is best seen as time-
dependent and uncertain, apt to reﬂect the underlying riskiness of the cash ﬂows to be discounted, i.e.,
it will generally incorporate a risk premium that reﬂects the risk aversion of market participants.
We can summarize these considerations in the following pricing formula for a generic asset charac-







j=1(1 + rf + Et[πt+j])
,
where Et[·] denotes the expectation operator conditional on Ft, that is the information available at time
5t; rf is the constant riskless interest rate, and πt+j ≥ 0 is the future, uncertain risk premium required
on the asset under consideration. H can be arbitrarily large, and in principle extend into the inﬁnite
future, like in the case of stocks.
At this point, a piece of news like the onset of a conﬂict consists of a change in the information set
Ft that therefore goes (say) from Ft−1 to Ft. The news will aﬀect the price of the asset through two
channels: the sequence of expected, future cash ﬂows {Et[Ct+j]}H
j=1 is also updated, and the sequence
of future risk premia {Et[πt+j]}H
j=1 also gets updated. This implies a change in the price of the asset,
∆Pt ≡ Pt − Pt−1.
Consider now two diﬀerent assets A and B, for example two national stock market indices. Three
implications can be drawn from the simple formula above regarding the eﬀects of political news on their
prices. First, ∆PA
t and ∆PB
t may diﬀer (and even have opposite signs) when either their expected cash
ﬂows Et[Ct+j] or their expected risk premia Et[πt+j] react diﬀerently to the news. Second, these
diﬀerences do not need to regard cash ﬂows to be immediately received, but can refer to any period
between t and H. For instance, a given political event may cause diﬀerent reactions in two national stock
markets, not because of its immediate impact on the GDP of the two countries in the following quarter,
but because of its long-ranging eﬀects, possibly for many years afterwards. Identical comments apply of
course to the risk premia. Third, notice that changes in prices do not need to reﬂect objective changes
in either fundamentals (cash ﬂows) or riskiness of the two assets, but changes in their expectations,




These diﬀerent perceptions may arise for diﬀerent assets, as in the example above, but also for
seemingly similar news, e.g., conﬂicts occurring in the same region. It is therefore crucial to understand
what factors aﬀect investors’ expectations on the eﬀects that an event — in particular, the onset of a
conﬂi c t—m a yh a v eo nf u t u r ec a s hﬂows or risk premia. Any variable aﬀecting the likelihood that the
conﬂict is resolved quickly should play an important role, as well as variables that help predict the
intensity of the conﬂict and the extent of disruption that it may bring to productive activities. In
this paper we focus on one of these variables, namely, the degree of socioeconomic polarization of the
country where the conﬂict takes place. Actually, due to data limitations at the cross country level, we
are constrained to using ethnic polarization as a proxy for broader socioeconomic polarization.
The theoretical link between ethnic polarization and asset market reactions to conﬂict onset is
ambiguous. On the one hand, in highly polarized societies it is easier to anticipate that a conﬂict may
occur. This argument is put forward in the seminal work of Horowitz (1985) and recently supported by
the empirical work of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a). To the extent that this is true, one should
ﬁnd that the “oﬃcial” onset of a conﬂict should have a weaker impact on asset markets if it occurs in
highly polarized environments, precisely because markets should have incorporated this expectation in
advance.
6On the other hand, polarization can also aﬀect the perceived intensity and duration of conﬂict.
Among others, La Porta et al. (1999) have argued that ethnically divided countries have more corrupt
and less eﬃcient governments which expropriate the ethnic losers. This in turn makes power sharing
arrangements more diﬃcult to sustain and increases the incentives of either side to prolong the conﬂict.
Recent theoretical work by Slantchev (2004) and Ponsat´ ı (2005) shows that war duration should be
longer the “closer to parity” are the capabilities of the contending parties. If we consider that highly
polarized societies are societies where the size of opponent groups is relatively more balanced (with the
highest polarization occurring when society is split into two equally sized groups), then we obtain the
prediction that conﬂict should last longer in more polarized settings. And indeed this is the empirical
ﬁnding of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol’s (2005b) paper: the authors ﬁnd that, other things equal, an
increase in ethnic polarization from zero to one doubles the median duration of a civil war. If this second
eﬀect (i.e., polarization increasing war duration) prevails, then we should expect asset market reactions
to be ampliﬁed when conﬂict occurs in ethnically polarized countries. In particular, if a conﬂict onset
is bad news, then it should be even more so in cases of “high polarization”, and if conﬂict is good news,
it should also be even more so in cases of “high polarization”. Which of the two eﬀects (predictability
of onset or increased duration) prevails is eventually an empirical issue that cannot be unambiguously
resolved on a theoretical level. Our empirical analysis will attempt to shed light on this question.
3. Event study methodology
The objective of the event study methodology (see the survey in Campbell et al. (1997)) is to quantify
the overall reaction of the price of one or more assets to the occurrence of events the timing of which
is known. In event studies, researchers aim at disentangling price reactions that can be attributed to
‘normal’, event-unrelated factors (such as general market conditions), from abnormal eﬀects that can
be reasonably imputed to the event under investigation. Such a task of separating event-driven from
normal price oscillations is accomplished by estimating some kind of regression-type model that links
asset returns to a number of explanatory variables that are suggested by ﬁnancial theory. The residuals
of this ‘null’ model are then interpreted as abnormal price ﬂuctuations (abnormal returns) caused by
the event under investigation.1
Denote with rt the rate of return on an asset, deﬁned as the percentage change in the price of the
asset in the unit of time, including possible cash distributions (dividends, coupons, etc.). Call T the
length of the period over which the null model is estimated. Then a factor model with structure
rt = α +
F X
j=1
βjfjt +  t, (1)
1The model is deﬁned to be the null one because - similarly to what happens in classical statistical hypothesis tests
- under the assumption that the model perfectly describes the behavior of asset returns, its residuals will be zero-mean,
white noise random variables that imply that the event(s) have no impact.
7is ﬁtted to a data set composed of T observations on asset returns and F explanatory factors {f1t,...,f Ft},
where the errors  t are white noise (with constant standard error σ )a n dα,β1,...,βF are unknown
parameters to be estimated. Application of standard econometric methods (such as OLS or GMM) will
deliver point estimates ˆ α, ˆ β1,...,ˆ βF, ˆ σ  to be used in what follows.
[Insert Figure 1]
The timeline for an event study can easily be illustrated with reference to Figure 1. Call t0 the date
on which an event of interest has occurred. Since there is often some uncertainty concerning the exact
moment in time in which the event has taken place or − more pertinently − on the precise moment
in which asset markets operators might have formed a belief on a high likelihood of occurrence of the
event, it is common practice to calculate and analyze the residuals from regressions like (1) not only
with reference to time t0, but instead over a wider event window [t0 −k, t0 +k] composed of a total of
k +1≥ 1 observations. Clearly, the case k = 0 corresponds to using information from the date of the
event only. The residuals of interest − called abnormal returns − are then calculated as:
et ≡ ˆ  t = rt − ˆ α −
F X
j=1
ˆ βjfjt t = t0 − k,...,t0 + k (2)
where ˆ α, ˆ β1,...,ˆ βF are the estimates obtained over the estimation window [t0 − k − T,t0 − k − 1]. The
choice of estimating the parameters characterizing the null model on a window that precedes (and never
overlaps with) the event window reﬂects a concern that the event(s) may have such powerful eﬀects as
to change the stochastic process followed by asset returns, i.e. the true (but unknown) values of the
parameters α,β1,...,βF,σ .
Since the objective of event studies is to quantify the overall, abnormal impact of one or more events
on asset prices, it is common practice to focus on a synthetic measure given by the cumulant of the





At this point, CAR > (<)0 is suggestive of a positive (negative) impact of the event at time t0 on asset
prices.
Of course, researchers should be wary of cases in which CAR 6= 0 but the measure is negligible,
especially when compared to the standard error of the null model. In other words, CAR 6=0m i g h tb e
due to pure chance and not to the ability of the event(s) to aﬀect asset prices. As a result, it is now
standard practice within the event study methodology to formally test the hypothesis
Ho : CAR =0 ( 3 )
8against a two-sided alternative, i.e., that the event produces some kind of aggregate impact on asset
returns, besides what is explained by the null model. Under standard statistical assumptions the null




ˆ σ2k +ˆ σ2ι0
kX0(˜ X0˜ X)−1X0ιk
∼ t(T−F−1)
where Xi≡ [ιk f1 ... fF]i st h ek × (F + 1) matrix of regressors.2 The (two-tailed) test statistic is
distributed as a t-Student with T − F − 1 degrees of freedom (i.e. T estimation window observations,
minus F +1 estimated parameters). Notice that the number of degrees of freedom is in practice related
to the length of the estimation window and not to the event window.
Note that the selection of the null model relative to which abnormal asset returns are calculated
plays a major role in the research design. In the literature two choices seem to be largely dominant: (i)
the CAPM and a few of its extensions, i.e. a theoretically justiﬁed, general equilibrium benchmark; (ii)
the so-called Market Model, which simply amounts to calculating which component of an asset return
cannot be explained by its comovements with some general market index (i.e., a portfolio collecting a
dominant portion of existing assets). For the market model the estimating equation becomes:
rt = α + βrI
t +  t, (4)
where rI
t is the market index. In practice, in this paper we estimate (4) using as a general market index
either a wide US stock market index (like the Standard & Poors 500) or a global, World stock market
index.3
3.1. Dummy regression tests
By construction, the event study methodology uses parameter estimates that are obtained over an
estimation window that precedes the event window. However, the union of the event and estimation
windows is often of a length (T + k), which is largely inferior to the overall sample available on the
behavior of asset prices. In fact, it is not infrequent to ﬁnd applications in which only 20 percent or so
of the available data are eventually employed. Another approach − often also deﬁned (improperly) as
an event study − consists of estimating a number of regressions in which the eﬀects of events on asset
returns is represented by appropriate dummy variables and the full sample is used.
Denote with τ the full length of the sample and consider the following Market Model:
rt = α + βrI
t + γIt + εt t =1 ,...,τ (5)
2ιk is deﬁned as a k × 1v e c t o ro fo n e s .fj ≡ [fjt0−k...fjt0+k−1]
0 is a k × 1 vector collecting the values assumed by the






−1 is the standard least squares covariance estimator.
3Clearly, when rt is selected to be a wide US stock market index, r
I
t can only be speciﬁed to coincide with a World
index.
9where εt is white noise and It is an indicator variable that takes value 1 over the event period and zero
otherwise. In the above formula, γ is the parameter of interest, as it measures the impact of the event
on asset returns. Formally, under the hypothesis that γ =0 , t h ee v e n tf a i l st op r o d u c ea n ye ﬀects on
asset returns. A test for whether the event had a positive or negative eﬀect on asset returns therefore
simply amounts to a t-test of whether the estimated parameter γ is zero or is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
4. Data
In our empirical analysis we use weekly data from January 2, 1974 to December 31, 2004 to assess the
eﬀects of conﬂict onset on several ﬁnancial variables. For this purpose, we combine data on political
events with data on stock and commodity prices. In what follows we brieﬂy describe the variables we
employ and the criteria for coding political events.
Our ﬁnancial indicators include, ﬁrst of all, stock market indices such as the S&P 500, MSCI
(Morgan Stanley Capital International) stock indices for the World, the US, UK, France and Japan.
We also use the trade-weighted exchange value of the US dollar versus major currencies; and the prices
of oil, gold, the Goldman Sachs general commodities and agricultural commodities indices, and the
CRB (Commodity Research Bureau) spot and future commodity indices. In particular, the Goldman
Sachs agricultural commodities spot index refers to cocoa, coﬀee, corn, cotton, soybeans, sugar, and
wheat. The general index includes weekly prices for energy (natural gas and petroleum), agricultural
(see above), precious metals, and industrial metals commodities. The CRB indices are similarly deﬁned.
Performing tests on future prices is particularly important in the case of commodity markets, since
most of the speculative trades − by construction more susceptible to be driven by revisions of beliefs
triggered by political events − take place in the futures segments and not in the spot markets where
commodities are often actually delivered and may satisfy production/consumption demands. In partic-
ular, oil prices are taken from the Wall Street Journal and correspond to the closing settlement price
on one-month future contracts written on West Texas Intermediate Oil stocks. Similarly, the tests
concerning the gold price actually refer to the closing price of six-month futures contracts; also in this
case, weekly settlement prices are compiled from the Wall Street Journal.
We also considered a sectoral stock market index which ex-ante might be of extreme interest, a
defense equity index for the US. Speciﬁcally, we obtain data on the weekly values of the Dow Jones’
Aerospace & Defense MicroSector Index, which is a continuously rebalanced basket comprising ﬁve blue
chip stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange.4
For information on political events, we rely on the PRIO-Uppsala Armed Conﬂict Dataset 3.0 (from
now on ACD) and retain conﬂict episodes for which onset can be attributed to a precise week.5 This
4The companies are Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed, Northrop, and Raytheon.
5In particular, we retain conﬂicts for which the start date is known with “precision” equal to one or two in the ACD.
10gives us a total of 112 episodes. Of these, 84 can be classiﬁed as “internal”, that is, they involve a
government and some internal opposition without external interventions. The remaining 28 episodes
p e r t a i nt ow h a tw el o o s e l yd e ﬁne as “international” conﬂicts, and they include what the ACD classiﬁes
as extrasystemic, interstate and internationalized conﬂicts.6 Importantly, a large portion of these
conﬂicts do not have a major economic or ﬁnancial motivation, and often purely involve (i.e. they are
internal to) countries of negligible international weight, both economic and political. For this reason,
one would not ex ante expect a large number of signiﬁcant episodes in the aggregate. Table 1 provides
a breakdown of the full sample of conﬂict onsets into diﬀerent categories.7
[Insert Table 1]
In addition to the distinction between internal and international conﬂicts, we try to identify patterns
of diﬀerential investor reactions according to other possible classiﬁcations. One is based on the location
of the conﬂict, i.e., we distinguish between conﬂicts taking place in Africa, Asia, America, Europe,
and the Middle East. Another classiﬁcation distinguishes between conﬂicts that involve oil producing
countries and conﬂicts that do not. In particular, we label as “oil conﬂicts” those that take place in
countries for which at least 1/3 of their export revenue comes from oil. The ﬁnal distinction we make is
between conﬂicts occurring in highly polarized regions and those occurring in low-polarization regions.
For this purpose we rely on Montalvo and Reynal-Querol’s (2005a) index of ethnic polarization for the
country where the conﬂict takes place and classify as “high polarization” a value of the index greater
or equal than the median, and as “low polarization” a value below the median.8
5. Results
In this section we present our results in three steps. We start with an illustration of the event study
methodology taking as a case study the second war against Iraq. This allows us to present a graphical
analysis as well as formal testing and to convey the ﬂavor of the approach that we have applied to all 112
conﬂict episodes in our sample. We next present a summary of the results of this more comprehensive
analysis, aggregating diﬀerent episodes depending on the categories deﬁned above. Finally, we report
a series of estimated dummy regressions to see what results we get when we use the full sample and to
illustrate the diﬀerence between the two approaches.
6“Extrasystemic” are conﬂicts between a state and a non-state group outside its territory; “interstate” are conﬂicts
between two or more states; and “internationalized” are conﬂicts between the government and internal opposition with
intervention from other states.
7A full list of conﬂict episodes with a brief description is available from the authors upon request.
8F o rw e e k si nw h i c hw eh a v em u l t i p l ec o n ﬂicts or for conﬂicts occurring in the territory of more than one country
(hence when we have multiple values of the polarization index), we have tried imputing several alternative values (e.g.,
the minimum, the maximum, and the average) and we generally get no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the results. Notice that
this occurs in a very small number of cases (8 out of 112 conﬂict onsets).
115.1. A case study of the Iraqi War
It is useful to start by illustrating the event study methodology through an example: the invasion of
Iraq on March 20, 2003 by the United States and a US-led coalition.9 For this purpose, we select
the week ending on March 21, 2003 as our event window and use an estimation window of 100 weeks
before the onset of the conﬂict to recover the model parameters. We then test whether the “abnormal
returns” recorded on a number of asset markets during the week of the event were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, and we report graphs with the evolution of the cumulative abnormal return in the ﬁve
weeks before and after the event (just to give a sense of the overall evolution of prices in the period
under consideration). The vertical lines in the ﬁgures below correspond to the week in which the event
(conﬂict onset) took place.
[Insert Figures 2-4]
Starting with the performance of the stock market indices, the evolution of the CAR for the MSCI
World index in Figure 2 shows a striking eﬀect: the cumulative abnormal increase during the week
ending March 21 calculated over the ﬁve preceding weeks is 10 percentage points, which is a huge
overall return in ﬁnancial terms. This is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Clearly, global investors
perceived the oﬃcial initiation of this conﬂi c ta s“ g o o dn e w s ”d e s p i t et h ef a c tt h a ti tw a sn o tt o t a l l y
unanticipated. An overall positive eﬀect also emerges for individual stock markets (although not for
Japan) and the impact is not always statistically signiﬁcant (see Figure 3). The impact on the more
restricted index for the defense sector is also positive in the week of the conﬂict, although not statistically
signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the event follows a number of weeks in which this index had been performing
very poorly, and the onset of the conﬂict marks a turnaround in the trend of the index (see Figure 4).
[Insert Figures 5-6]
Figure 5 shows the impact of the event on commodity markets: the eﬀect is negative for all our
commodity indices, and is largest in magnitude for commodity futures (“CRBfuture” and “GScom-
modity”), reaching a decline of 11 percentage points for the CRB index and of 16 percentage points
for the Goldman Sachs index, compared to the ﬁve preceding weeks. Actually, for the latter index the
drop is of more than 20 percentage points in two weeks, which appears to be of a ﬁrst-magnitude scale.
The diﬀerence between the reactions of spot vs. futures markets is easily traceable to the bigger role
played by speculative demands components in the latter markets. Therefore world commodity markets
seem to have perceived the actual invasion of Iraq as bad news, although once more the most sensi-
ble interpretation is that the arm wrestling between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the international
9The coalition also includes (in decreasing order based on the number of troops committed): United Kingdom, South
Korea, Italy, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, Australia,N e t h e r l a n d s ,J a p a n ,D e n m a r k , Bulgaria and several other
countries with minor comitments.
12community might have caused an excess demand motivated by the desire to hoard stocks and escape
pessimistic but extreme scenarios (e.g. non-conventional war tactics on either sides): when such fears
dissipate and the war is actually initiated, the excess demand disappears and commodity prices fall.
The most severe drop, however, is experienced by oil futures. It can be seen in Figure 6 that the
cumulative abnormal return on West Texas intermediate oil future contracts was negative and about 34
percentage points in magnitude during the week of the conﬂict, when calculated with reference to the
two preceding weeks; this eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Clearly, investors interpreted the
initiation of a conventional, limited Iraqi War as an indication that the world’s oil production would
be aﬀected on a limited scale only, thus curbing both speculative pressures and the tendency to hoard
(i.e. to anticipate the timing of future, expected purchases).
[Insert Figure 7]
Finally, Figure 7 shows the evolution of the Gold futures index and of the trade-weighted dollar
exchange rate. While there does not seem to be any statistically signiﬁcant impact on futures gold
prices (which decline very sluggishly), the eﬀect is markedly positive and signiﬁcant for the dollar.
Again, this suggests that markets viewed the initiation of the conﬂict as positive for the US economy,
possibly suggesting a war rally eﬀect.
Overall, our results from this event study diﬀer from those of Rigobon and Sack (2005) and Wolfers
and Zitzewitz (2004), who ﬁnd positive eﬀects on oil prices and negative eﬀects on the dollar. However,
their analysis is ex ante and regards the perceived risk of war, while ours is ex post and reﬂects market
reactions to how the actual initiation of the war (and possibly the evolution over the ﬁrst few days of
the conﬂict) would aﬀect ﬁnancial variables.
5.2. A large sample event study: synthetic results
In this section we summarize the results of the 112 event studies that we conducted, reporting the
percentage of cases in which the null of no eﬀect of the conﬂict was rejected against the alternative
of negative or positive eﬀect. We discuss in the main text the tests signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level
and for an event window including only the week of the conﬂict onset. However, we also performed
sensitivity analysis for the cases in which the signiﬁcance level is set at 10 percent or the event window
is set to include the week before and the week after the conﬂict onset.10
[Insert Table 2]
Table 2 reports our ﬁrst set of results on MSCI stock market indices. Starting from the full set
of conﬂicts, we see that 11.2% of them have a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the World index,
10The results, available from the authors upon request, are very similar.
13and 6.7% have a positive eﬀect. The US market seems to be the one that reacts the most, with
7.9% of the cases being negative and 12.4% being positive. This contrasts with the UK stock index
(3.4% negative, 9% positive), with the French index (4.5% negative, 7.9% positive) and with the
Japanese one (5.6% negative, 5.6% positive). In general, these reactions seem to be rather weak, as
it seems that at most for only 20% of the conﬂict episodes in our sample stock prices reacted with
appreciable strength. Interestingly, the national stock markets react − if at all − with price increases
more frequently than with price declines. This is less surprising than it may seem as what may normally
depress equity valuations is in practice the uncertainty on future streams of proﬁts and discount rates
that accompanies the periods that precede a conﬂict, not the onset of the conﬂict itself. The case
study in Section 4.1 provides speciﬁc evidence on one such episode in which stock markets rallied up
after a prolonged period of uncertainty on the impending war that lasted between the end of 2002 and
March 2003. Interestingly, an overall, World equity index displays the opposite pattern, i.e. negative
reactions occur more frequently than the positive ones: this is consistent with the stock markets of the
countries directly involved (when in existence) as well as of the neighboring countries showing sharp
drops, while the major national stock markets not involved often manifest an opposite trend. Finally,
the fact that the US market appears to be the most reactive one (in both directions), may simply reﬂect
the fact that over time the bulk of the speculative activity has moved towards the most eﬃcient (i.e.
least costly) ﬁnancial centers (the NYSE and NASDAQ), while scores of companies not located in the
United States have elected to be listed either in the US, or to issue synthetic securities (ADRs) that
represent stock certiﬁcates issued outside the US. Additionally, especially since the mid-1980s, the US
have been involved in an above-average number of international conﬂicts, often with the objective to
police complex disputes. This creates a direct link between conﬂicts and the perspectives (e.g. budget
deﬁcits) of the US economy.
When we distinguish between internal and international conﬂicts, we ﬁnd that in general the fraction
of signiﬁcant results is higher for international than for internal conﬂicts, in both directions. In this
case, the markets of the US, the UK, and France display signiﬁcant reactions in almost 25% of the
conﬂicts, which seems remarkable given that also episodes of moderate international and/or economic
r e l e v a n c eb e l o n gt oo u rs a m p l e . 11 The only exception is the World stock market index, on which the
share of internal conﬂicts having a negative impact was 13.4% , as compared to 8.3% of the international
ones. However, only 4.5% of the internal conﬂicts had a positive impact on the World index, as opposed
to 12.5% of the international ones. The markets that seem to react most diﬀerently to internal versus
international conﬂicts are the UK and France. International conﬂicts seem to have abnormal positive
eﬀects on the UK stock market, and negative eﬀect on the French one. In fact, the share of internal
conﬂicts having a negative eﬀects on stock prices is 3% for the UK and 1.5% for France, while the
11For example, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that the Eritrea - Ethiopia conﬂict in May 1998 did not strongly aﬀect the
world stock markets. This comment applies to at least one-third of the episodes in our sample.
14analogous ﬁgures for international conﬂicts are 4.2% and 16.7%, respectively. The latter ﬁgure is
particularly high given the sample considered. The instances of positive impact, on the other hand,
are 4.5% and 7.5% for the UK and France in the case of internal conﬂicts, and 20.8% and 8.3% for
international ones. Again, the ﬁgure for the UK seems noteworthy. As in the full sample, when we
disaggregate between internal and international conﬂicts the US index is the one that yields on average
the highest proportion of signiﬁcant results: 7.5% of internal conﬂicts have a negative impact, and 10.4%
have a positive one, while for international conﬂicts these ﬁgures are 8.3% and 16.7%, respectively. This
suggests two facts: ﬁrst, international conﬂicts tend to aﬀect stock markets more frequently; second, it
is more likely that the US market reacts positively to the onset of conﬂicts rather than negatively. This
is suggestive evidence for the possibilities of war rallies in the US stock market. Finally, the Japanese
stock market index is relatively less responsive compared to the others: on average the fraction of
signiﬁcant eﬀects is around 5% and there is no sensible diﬀerence between internal and international
conﬂicts, nor between the likelihood of negative versus positive impact.
Next, we distinguish conﬂicts based on the region where they occur, namely, Africa, Asia, America,
Europe, and the Middle East. Starting with the World MSCI stock index, the ﬁrst notable result
emerging from Table 2 is that 23.5% of the conﬂicts occurring in Asia have a negative and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on this index, and only 5.9% have a positive eﬀect. The second region in terms of incidence of
“negative” conﬂicts is Europe: 11.8% of the conﬂicts occurring in Europe lead to negative abnormal
r e t u r n si nt h eW o r l di n d e x ,a n d5 . 9 %l e a dt op o s i t i v e abnormal returns. Africa, on the other hand, is
the continent with the highest incidence of conﬂicts that are perceived as “good news” by world ﬁnancial
markets: 11.4% of the conﬂicts occurring in Africa lead to positive abnormal returns, as opposed to 8.6%
that lead to negative returns. Contrary to common wisdom, the onset of conﬂicts in the Middle East
does not seem to aﬀect the World stock index more often than conﬂicts in other regions. Things change,
however, when we look at the US stock market index: in this case 16.7% of the conﬂicts in the Middle
East lead to negative abnormal returns, and there is not one single instance of positive returns. Indeed,
the Middle East is in absolute terms the region where conﬂict has the strongest negative eﬀects on the
US stock market. On the contrary (with the partial exception of Africa), conﬂicts elsewhere in the
world seem to positively aﬀect US stock prices more often than they cause negative eﬀects. Therefore,
from a US perspective, there exists a clear diﬀerence between Middle-Eastern conﬂicts and all other
conﬂicts. A possible speculative argument is that episodes involving Israel and hence the long-term
alliance with the US may be driving this ﬁnding. Notice that the association between Middle-East and
“oil conﬂicts” fails: US stock markets weakly react to oil-related episodes, and when they do, prices
tend to climb up. The US defense sector seems to beneﬁt( i nn e tt e r m s )f r o mA f r i c a nc o n ﬂicts and to
derive losses from Middle-Eastern and oil-related episodes. Both patterns may be rationalized in the
light of the sales patterns of the companies involved (i.e., Africa generates demand, while conﬂicts in
15the Middle-East may erode the purchasing power of Israel).12
[Insert Table 3]
In Table 3 we report results on several indices of commodity prices, agricultural commodities, oil,
gold and the dollar exchange rate. Our goal is to understand whether these prices respond to perceived
shortages that may follow the war or, in the case of gold and the dollar, whether they act as safe-havens.
As in the case of stock market indices, looking at the full sample of conﬂicts, it is diﬃcult to identify any
pattern: about 10-12% of the conﬂict onsets lead to rejections of the null of no eﬀect, more often against
the alternative of positive eﬀects than against the alternative of negative eﬀects. When we distinguish
between internal and international conﬂicts, we see that some indices react to both types of conﬂict (for
example, commodities and agricultural commodities), while others typically react to a single category.
In particular, the price of gold only responds to internal conﬂicts, while the positive eﬀect on the dollar
exchange rate is most often observed in the presence of international conﬂicts. Looking within the set
of commodity indices, international conﬂicts induce negative reactions in the CRB futures commodity
index in 14.8% of the cases, while the ﬁgure is lower in the case of spot commodity indices. Also in
this case, the eﬀects on futures prices are stronger than those on spot prices, as one should expect.
Finally, since diﬀerent indices weight diﬀerent markets/commodities diﬀerently, some heterogeneity in
the responses to conﬂict events is visible.
In terms of location, conﬂicts occurring in the Middle East are the ones with the greatest impact
on commodity prices, as measured by the Goldman Sachs indices, and especially on oil futures: 40%
of conﬂict onsets in this region have a negative and signiﬁcant impact on oil futures, and 20% have
a positive impact. Location in the Middle East seems a better proxy for the importance of oil as a
natural resource around which conﬂict may occur than the categorization of Fearon and Latin (2003)
based on a country’s oil exports as a share of the total. In fact only 17% of the conﬂicts classiﬁed as
“oil-related” according to Fearon and Laitin’s data have a signiﬁcant impact on oil futures prices, either
negative or positive (see the last row of Table 3). It is also interesting to notice that the reaction of a
trade-weighted dollar exchange rate is roughly symmetric between positive and negative reactions for
African, Asian, and Middle-Estern conﬂicts. On the contrary, European and American conﬂicts have
no eﬀect.
5.3. Dummy regression approach
[Insert Table 4]
12It is harder to interpret results for UK, France, and Japan. While in Japan the eﬀects are generally weak, the UK
stands out by reacting positively to both Middle-Eastern and oil-related conﬂicts. In this case, an explanation based on
the fact that the UK is a net exporter of raw materials (in particular natural gas and also crude oil) may be appealing.
More diﬃcult to understand are the positive (but weak) reactions to European conﬂicts.
16We conclude this section by performing a few full-sample, regression-based tests of the hypothesis
that violent conﬂict does not impact asset prices. As discussed in Section 2.2, we use a dummy approach,
in which the dates (weeks) of the onset of conﬂicts are simply represented by an indicator function that
takes unit value. In Table 4, we report results of regressions explaining stock index returns. Results
for commodities are qualitatively similar and therefore omitted, but they are available upon request.
Table 4 may be viewed as an enormous advertising spot supporting the usefulness of an event study
approach to the investigation of the eﬀects of political events on asset prices. Although a market
model-based framework produces some interesting explanatory power for MSCI stock returns (with R-
s q u a r e sa sh i g ha s0 . 8 1f o rU Sr e t u r n s ) ,i ng e n e r a lt h ec o n ﬂict dummy fails to be statistically signiﬁcant.
Moreover, the signs of the estimated coeﬃcients associated with the conﬂict dummies are quite erratic,
besides being small and therefore negligible also in an economic sense (typically a conﬂict moves returns
less than 0.2% in absolute value).
When the estimation results are disaggregated on the basis of the internal vs. external nature of
the conﬂict, or as a function of their geographical location, the picture hardly improves: only UK
returns seem to react to conﬂict news, although the signs remain diﬃcult to interpret and their size
is rather small. Surprisingly, oil-related conﬂicts produce negligible eﬀects on all stock indices under
examination.
The reason for this lack of signiﬁcance in aggregate OLS regressions is twofold. On the one hand,
when the parameter on the conﬂict dummy is estimated by pooling episodes of major international
relevance with minor ones, the resulting impact is naturally attenuated. Secondly, using the full sample
to recover model parameter estimates amounts to incorporating some of the markets’ “abnormal”
reactions into the “normal” parameter estimates of non-conﬂict variables, which also produces an
attenuation of the estimated conﬂict parameter. The event study approach improves the results on
both grounds: ﬁrst as it allows to study each conﬂict in isolation; second as it isolates the estimation
from the event window and only collects abnormal reactions in the latter.
6. Ethnic polarization and asset market reactions
Our ﬁnal goal is to assess the role played by polarization in shaping asset market reactions to the
initiation of violent conﬂict. As we mentioned above, the onset of a conﬂict per se may not contain
particularly useful information for investors, either because the conﬂict was already anticipated, or
b e c a u s et o ol i t t l ei sk n o w na b o u th o wt h ec o n ﬂict will evolve. For this reason, any indicator that may
aﬀect either the likelihood of conﬂict or the subsequent duration and intensity may be valuable from the
point of view of ﬁnancial analysts. In what follows we take polarization to be one such variable and we
try to shed light on the empirical relationships between ethnic polarization and asset market reactions
by aggregating the result of our 112 event studies depending on the degree of ethnic polarization of the
country where they occur. As we explained in section 3, we deﬁne as “highly polarized” conﬂicts that
17take place in countries whose ethnic polarization index − as computed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005a) − is greater than or equal to the sample median, and we include in the “low polarization”
category the remaining ones. Recall from section 2 that a priori we do not know whether to expect
stronger results for the high or for the low polarization cases. On the one hand, in fact, conﬂict onset
is easier to predict in polarized societies, hence the oﬃcial starting date contains less information and
we should get weaker results for high polarization cases. On the other hand, provided that polarization
increases the duration (and intensity) of a war, we can also expect the economic eﬀects of conﬂict to
be magniﬁed in polarized societies, and this would lead to more signiﬁcant results for high polarization
cases.
[Insert Tables 5, 6]
Table 5 contains results for stock market indices. As before, numbers in the Table represent the
percentage of cases in which a given type of conﬂict had a negative or positive impact on stock abnormal
returns, and this eﬀect is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. The diﬀerence with respect
to previous tables is that now, for each category of conﬂict, there are two rows: one referring to high
polarization cases and one to low polarization ones. It is clear from the Table that high polarization
reinforces, instead of attenuating, the impact of conﬂict onset on asset prices. In other words, of the
two possible eﬀects described above, the second one seems to prevail. Consider for example the MSCI
World index. In 12.5% of the high polarization cases the index reacted negatively and signiﬁcantly
to the initiation of conﬂict, as opposed to 8.8% of the low polarization ones. The contrast is even
more marked if we focus on international conﬂicts. More than 18% of the international conﬂicts taking
place in highly polarized countries have a negative impact on the MSCI World index, and none of
those taking place in countries with low polarization do. A similar pattern emerges for individual stock
markets. Notice that the discrepancy between high and low polarization cases holds for both negative
and positive reactions. For example, 27.3% of international conﬂicts occurring in highly polarized
settings had a positive impact on the US index, and only 12.5% of those occurring in low polarization
areas did. This is consistent with the conjecture that polarization “magniﬁes” the eﬀects of conﬂict,
rather than having an unambiguously good or bad eﬀect.
When we examine the results on spot and future commodity prices as well as oil and gold future
prices in Table 6, the pattern is again the same. In general, commodity futures react more to news
about conﬂict onset when conﬂicts occur in highly polarized countries. To take an example, 13.3% of
the “high polarization” conﬂicts had a positive impact on the Goldman Sachs commodity index, and
none of the “low polarization” ones did. Within international conﬂicts, the share of positive (negative)
eﬀects on the Goldman Sachs commodity index was 18.2% (9.1%) for the high polarization cases, as
opposed to zero in both directions for the low polarization ones. Similar results emerge, among other
variables, for oil futures.
18Overall, the fact that we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant role for polarization is quite extraordinary, given the
coarse nature of this variable compared to the weekly-frequency ﬁnancial data and to the degree of
heterogeneity in our sample of conﬂicts. Our results suggest that further work in this direction may be
fruitful.
7. Concluding remarks
Asset markets constitute an interesting environment to study the economic eﬀects of violent conﬂict,
because analysts and investors trading on such markets are generally sensitive to news regarding the
future prospects of the economies that are of some importance for the assets they trade. In this paper
we have applied the event study methodology − a methodology that is widely used in ﬁnance but
seldom in political science − to study markets’ reactions to the initiation of violent conﬂict. In order
to conduct a large sample study, we consider as “events” all conﬂict onsets that can be dated in a
precise week between 1974 and 2004. Surprisingly (given the degree of heterogeneity among conﬂicts
and the fact that a number of them may have been anticipated), we do ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects on asset
prices in a non-negligible fraction of the cases. Also, ethnic polarization in the region where the conﬂict
occurs seems to have some predictive power, most likely as it is perceived to increase the intensity and
duration of the conﬂict. Our results suggest the usefulness of applying this methodology to both large
sample and to detailed case studies within the conﬂict literature. Furthermore, enriching existing cross
country databases to include other indices of polarization (in addition to the ethnic polarization index
we employ) could allow a more systematic study of the relationship between socioeconomic polarization
and asset market reactions.
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Figure 4: Defense index 
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Figure 6: Oil futures 
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Figure 7: Safe-havens 
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Table 1: Conflicts  
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Middle East  15 
  




   26
Table 2: MSCI Stock Indices (5% significance level; event window -0; +0) 
 
 WORLD  USA  UK  FRANCE  JAPAN  DEFENSE 
  <0  >0  <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 
                
All 11.2  6.7  7.9  12.4  3.4  9  4.5  7.9  5.6  5.6  6.7  10.1 
                
SCOPE                
Internal 13.4  4.5  7.5  10.5  3  4.5  1.5  7.5  6  4.5  9  9 
International 8.3 12.5  8.3  16.7  4.2  20.8  16.7  8.3  4.2  8.3 0  16.7 
                
LOCATION                
Africa 8.6  11.4  11.4  8.6  2.9  8.6  2.9  5.7  0  5.7  0  17.1 
Asia 23.5  5.9  5.9  11.8  5.9  0  0  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  5.9 
Americas 8.3  0  0  25  8.3  0  16.7  8.3  16.7  0  8.3  8.3 
Europe  11.8  5.9  0 23.5 0 11.8  5.9 5.9 5.9  0  0  5.9 
Middle  East  8.3  8.3 16.7 0  0  25 8.3 8.3  0  8.3 25 8.3 
                
RESOURCES                
Oil 10.3  3.5  3.5  13.8  0  6.9  3.5  6.9  6  3.5  13.8  3.5 
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Table 3: Commodities (5% significance level; event window -0; +0) 
 
  CRB spot  CRB futures  GS Commodity GS Agric comm  Oil futures  Gold futures  Exchange rate
  <0 >0 <0 >0 <0  >0  <0  >0  <0  >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 
                    
All  5.9 2  7.8 3.9 3.5  5.8  4.6  5.8 8.2  6.6 3.7 4.9 4.5 4.5 
                    
SCOPE                    
Internal  5.3 2.7 5.3 5.3 3.1  6.2  4.6  6.2 6.5  8.7 4.7 6.3 4.5 1.5 
International  7.4  0  14.8  0  4.2 8.3 8.3  4.2 11.8  5.9  0  0  4.2  12.5 
                    
LOCATION                    
Africa  2.7 0  5.4 2.7 0  3  0  6.1 8.3  4.2 6.1 0  5.7 5.7 
Asia  4.8 4.8 9.5 9.5 5.9  0  5.9  0  0 10  0  12.5  5.9 5.9 
Americas 7.1  0 0 0 0 0 8.3 0 0  11.1  0 0 0 0 
Europe  5.9 5.9 0  5.9 0  11.8  5.9  11.8  6.3  6.3 6.3 6.3 0  0 
Middle  East  0 0 0 0 16.7  8.3  16.7  8.3  40  20  0 10  8.3  8.3 
                    
RESOURCES                    
Oil  6.1 0  9.1 9.1 6.9  6.9  6.9  6.9 11.1  5.6 3.6 7.1 6.9 3.5 
   28









  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Conflict -0.001  0.001  0.002  0.000  -0.002  0.001 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
        
Observations  1547 1547 1547 1547 1547 1774 













SCOPE  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Internal  -0.003  0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
International 0.004  0.003  0.011**  -0.006  -0.006  0.009* 
  (0.004)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
         
Observations  1547  1547 1547 1547 1547 1774 
R-squared  0.00  0.81 0.20 0.19 0.09 0.37 
 









LOCATION  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Africa -0.001  -0.001  0.008*  -0.003  -0.000  0.007 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Americas -0.007  0.010***  -0.013*  -0.010  -0.015**  -0.004 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Asia -0.006  0.003  -0.012**  0.004  -0.005  -0.005 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Europe  0.001 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Middle  East  0.009*  -0.004  0.019***  0.008 0.007 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
        
Observations  1547 1547 1547 1547 1547 1774 
R-squared  0.00 0.81 0.21 0.19 0.09 0.37 
 









RESOURCES (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            
Oil 0.002  0.003  0.000  0.001  -0.005  -0.005 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.005) 
            
Observations 1547 1547 1547  1547  1547 1774 
R-squared 0.00  0.81  0.20  0.19  0.09  0.37 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5 : polarization - MSCI Stock Indices (5% significance level; event window -0; +0) 
 
     WORLD  USA  UK  FRANCE  JAPAN  DEFENSE 
  Polarization  Nr.  obs  <0 >0  <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 
                   
All  High  42  12.5 9.4  9.4 15.6  6.3 6.3 9.4 6.3 3.1 3.1 12.5  9.4 
 Low  41  8.8  8.8  5.9  11.8  2.9  11.8  2.9  8.8  5.9  8.8  5.9  5.9 
                   
SCOPE                   
Internal High  31 13  4.4  8.7  8.7  4.4  0  4.4  8.7  0  4.4  17.4  13 
 Low  32  11.5  7.7  7.7  11.5  3.9  11.4  0  7.7  7.7  7.7  7.7  0 
International High  11  18.2  18.2  9.1 27.3 9.1 18.2  27.3  0  9.1  0  9.1  0 
  Low  9  0  12.5  0  12.5  0  12.5 12.5 12.5  0  12.5  0  25 
                   
LOCATION                   
Africa High  17  14.3  14.3  14.3  14.3  7.1  7.1  0  0  0  7.1  14.3  0 
  Low  18  0  11.8  5.9  5.9  0  11.8 5.9 11.8  0  5.9  0  11.8 
Asia  High  9  0  0  20 0  0  0  0 20 0  0 40 0 
 Low  8  42.9  14.3  0  28.6  14.3  0  0  14.3  14.3  14.3  0  0 
Americas High  9  12.5  0 0  25  12.5  0  25  12.5  12.5  0  12.5  12.5 
 Low  7  0  0  0  25  0  0  0  0  25  0  0  0 
Europe  High  5  20  20 0  40  0  20  20  0 0 0 0 0 
 Low  1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Middle  East  High  6  25  25 0 0 0 0  25  0 0 0  25  25 
 Low  7  0  0  16.7  0  0  33.3  0  0  0  16.7  33.3  0 
RESOURCES                   
Oil  High  12  20 10  0 10 0  0 10 0  0  0 20  10 
 Low  14  0  0  7.7  7.7  0  15.4  0  7.7  7.7  7.7  15.4  0 
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Table 6: Polarization - Commodities (5% significance level; event window -0; +0) 
 




Oil Gold  Exchange 
rate 
    <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 >0  <0  >0  <0  >0 <0 >0 
                    
All  High  9.5 4.8 9.5 7.1 6.7  13.3 6.7 10 10 10  0  3.7 0  6.3 
  Low  2.8 0  8.3 2.8 2.9  0  2.9 2.9 9.1 4.6 3  6.1 11.8  2.9 
                    
SCOPE                   
Internal  High  10.3  6.9 6.9 10.3  4.8  14.3 9.5 9.5 7.1 14.3  0  4.8 0  4.4 
  Low  3.7 0  7.4 3.7 3.9  0  3.9 3.9 6.3 6.3 4  8  11.5  0 
International  High  7.7  0  15.4 0  9.1  18.2  9.1  9.1  12.5 12.5 0  0  0  9.9 
  Low  0  0  11.1  0  0 0 0  0  16.7  0  0  0  12.5  12.5 
                    
LOCATION                   
Africa  High  6.2  0 6.2  0 0  8.3  0 8.3  0 12.5  0 0 0 7.1 
  Low  0  0  5.9 5.9 0  0  0  5.9 7.7 0  5.9 0  11.8  5.9 
Asia  High  0  11.1 11.1 22.2 20  0  0  0  0  0  0  20  0  0 
  Low 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 0 0 33.3  0 16.7  14.3  0 
Americas  High  11.1  0 0 0 0  25 12.5  0 0 16.7  0 0 0 0 
  Low 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Europe  High  25 25 0  25 0  20  20 40 25 0  0  0  0  0 
  Low  n.a   n.a  n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Middle  East  High 16.7  0 33.3  0 25 25 25  0 50  50  0 0 0  25 
 Low  14.3  0  28.6  0  16.7  0  16.7  0  33.3  0  0  16.7  16.7  0 
RESOURCES                   
Oil  High 7.7  0 15.4  0 10 20 10  0 14.3  14.3  0 0 0  10 
 Low  7.1  0  7.1  0  7.7  0  7.7  7.7  16.7  0  7.7  7.7  15.4  0 
                    
 